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402 Abstract
With the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris 
Agreement the general idea of sustainable development has been transformed into 
a policy concept with well-defined goals, indicators for measurement and an 
implementation process. To reduce environmental impact (e.g. on climate, SDG 13) 
two basic options are available: efficiency and sufficiency. Eco-efficiency (less 
environmental impact per unit of GDP) still plays the most important role and has 
the potential to delink economic growth and environmental impact. Growth could 
continue (green growth). However, rates of efficiency increase are not (yet) large 
enough to comply with e.g. climate goals – and efficiency increase is (partly) com-
pensated by rebound effects. Therefore, greater emphasis on the sufficiency option 
(lower GDP) is necessary, i.e. consumption patterns and lifestyles will have to 
change; in macro-economic terms: economic growth (in rich countries) will have 
to end. This has significant consequences for the transformation of economies and 
societies and for government policies, which have been dominated by growth pol-
icy. Nevertheless, given the ambitious environmental (climate) goals and the only 
small effects of efficiency strategies, strengthening of the sufficiency option is 
inevitable. Only with policy concepts that integrate the efficiency and sufficiency 
components is there a chance to fulfill environmental SDGs – which are the foun-
dation for many other SDGs. 
Keywords: delinking, GDP, green growth, happiness, IPAT equation, rebound 
effect, secular stagnation, transformation
1 INTRODUCTION
After almost three decades of intensive global debate on sustainable development 
the year 2015 changed the scene fundamentally. What the Brundtland-Report 
(WCED, 1987) and the two Rio Summits in 1992 and in 2012 had prepared, cul-
minated in two global agreements: the UN Agenda 2030 with the SDGs and the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The sustainable development debate has a 
new quality now; it has been transformed into a political commitment with well-
defined common goals, indicators for measurement and an implementation pro-
cess. The core features of the “future we want” (UN conference Rio+20) are clear. 
This progress was overdue. Alarming reports from the IPCC (2018) on climate 
change and the IPBES (2019) on biodiversity loss were complemented by “empir-
ical evidence” that everybody can experience without complex measurement 
methods: weather extremes (heatwaves, droughts, floods, storms and wildfires) 
and the disappearance of formerly common species (bees, butterflies and so on). 
The global ecological crisis seems no longer far away, rather, mankind is already 
in the middle of it. 
While climate change (SDG 13) and – to a lesser extent – biodiversity loss (SDGs 
14, 15) are in the focus now, sustainable development is more complex and has to 
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403socio-economic goals – primarily poverty reduction (and the related hunger, 
health and education goals). Nevertheless, coping with the environmental limita-
tions and goals is considered fundamental to sustainable development. All socio-
economic problem solving will turn out useless if the “solutions” are accompanied 
with the overburdening of eco-systems and resource bases. Socio-economic prob-
lems will then return even more fiercely. 
While sustainable development addresses inter-generational justice and respect 
for future generations, the “old” problems of intra-generational justice did not 
disappear and are closely interwoven with the inter-generational ones. In a simpli-
fied global perspective there is a wealthy billion and there is a billion living in 
extreme poverty and in between there is a five-billion strong “middle class” cop-
ing with a declining hope for upward mobility. As emphasized already in the 
Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987: 54) the “needs of the present” are “in particular 
the essential needs of the world’s poor” (e.g. the bottom billion). They need more 
goods, i.e. economic growth (with growth rates of 7% p.a., see SDG 8). 
For the affluent billion the question and the sustainability challenge are very dif-
ferent: “How much is enough”? (Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012), is it time to 
change consumption patterns and lifestyles and to switch from over-consumption 
to sufficiency? So far, not much attention has been dedicated to this question in 
economic literature or in government policy in the rich nations. The potential 
conflict between the dominating economic growth paradigm and environmental 
SDGs has been resolved by the idea of eco-efficiency and Green Growth (GG). 
When confronted with environmental and resource limitations, the traditional 
paradigm of economic growth can prevail as eco-efficiency increases will delink 
output (Gross Domestic Product GDP) and input (of natural resources). 
This article starts with defining and explaining the strategic options for the reduc-
tion of environmental impacts (part 2). It will then discuss the concept of eco-
efficiency and what this strategic option can contribute to environmental SDGs. 
This part (3) also addresses the relevance of rebound effects. The subject of part 4 
is the sufficiency option, both micro-economic (consumption patterns) and macro-
economic aspects (secular stagnation). In part 5 some conclusions are presented 
and it is argued that only a combination of the efficiency and the sufficiency option 
has a chance to meet ambitious environmental SDGs. The focus in this article is 
on rich, developed countries only (as e.g. organized in the OECD). This is not a 
homogeneous group, but no differentiation between countries is made here. Most 
examples focus on climate change (SDG 13) because this is the most urgent and 
most elaborated of the SDGs. The most relevant socio-economic goal is economic 
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404 2  STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  
EFFICIENCY AND SUFFICIENCY 
2.1 THE NORMATIVE STARTING POINT 
Economic analysis starts with political goals which are defined in political, demo-
cratic processes by parliaments. Economists then provide advice and recommen-
dations about how to achieve these given goals effectively and efficiently. In the 
case of climate change (SDG13) the goal has been formulated as a consequence of 
the legally binding Paris Agreement to limit global temperature increase to 2°C, 
better 1.5°C only (compared to pre-industrial time). The question for science (eco-
nomics) is how to decarbonize the economy by 2050 globally? The EU has formu-
lated this goal (EU Commission, 2018). Rich countries like Germany lag behind: 
minus 80-95% by 2050 (relative to 1990), i.e. “almost” decarbonized. The expec-
tation would be that rich countries play a pioneer role and decarbonize well before 
2050. Climate science provides information on the additional quantity of CO2-
emissions that are (with high probability) compatible with the 1.5°C goal. There 
is a “carbon budget” of roughly 800 gigatonnes (Gt) CO2-emissions (IPCC 2018). 
For a world population of 8 billion this equals 100 tons per capita – under the 
(normative) assumption that each person should have an equal share of the carbon 
budget. This means: neglecting the historical burden that early-industrialized 
countries like the UK and Germany had already accumulated over the previous 
150 years. For Germany with about 80 million inhabitants (1% of the world’s 
population) under the equality assumption the national carbon budget is 8 Gt. 
Given the annual emissions of about 800 million tons, the German budget would 
cover ten years. Only radical reduction steps could extend this to 20 years. Every 
year 40 million tons have to be eliminated and Germany has to be carbon neutral 
by 2040 (Kurz, Spangenberg and Zahrnt, 2019). 
2.2 TWO COMPONENTS
When the environmental goal is given, strategic options for compliance can be 
discussed next. The starting point is the simplest version of decomposing environ-
mental impact I by an extension of the identity I = I: 
I = I / GDP * GDP
Impact I is determined by two variables: GDP is a measure of the production (out-
put) of an economy. I/GDP is the eco-efficiency of the economy and measures 
how much environmental impact is caused by producing one unit of GDP. The 
reciprocal GDP/I is productivity, i.e. how much GDP is produced with one impact 
unit (e.g. one tonne of CO2-emissions). This is the standard definition in econom-
ics primarily used for labour productivity: GDP/worker. For more specific eco-
efficiency indicators e.g. in a business context see UN (2009). 
If GDP increases (economic growth), environmental impact I will increase too, all 
other things being equal. However, if I/GDP declines, I may decline – even if GDP 
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405eco-efficiency increase, economic growth can continue while at the same time 
environmental impact is reduced. 
Here are some examples which have been discussed in the literature and have 
some political relevance: 
(a) Factor 4: (Weizsäcker, Lovins and Lovins, 1997): If over a period of 20-30 
years eco-efficiency were to quadruple, GDP could double (grow at 2-3% p.a.) 
and yet I could be reduced by 50%.
I = I / GDP * GDP
1/2 = 1/4 * 2
This would require an increase of eco-efficiency of 4-5% p.a. 
(b) Factor 3: A GDP growth rate of 2% p.a. would increase the GDP by roughly 
50% in the period 2020-2040. If the environmental protection goal is to reduce 
impact I over that period by 50% the formula reads: 
1/2 = I / GDP * 1.5 = 1/3 * 3/2
Eco-efficiency has to increase by a factor of 3, i.e. to produce one unit of GDP in 
2040 only a third of the resources (emissions) of 2020 are required. This implies 
an annual increase of eco-efficiency of more than 5%. So far, there is no empirical 
evidence that such high efficiency increase rates are possible over many years. 
Most OECD countries show rates of 1-2% p.a. (Kurz, 2014). An “efficiency revo-
lution” would be necessary, i.e. a doubling of efficiency growth rates.
(c) Factor 20: Climate policy goal in Germany is to reduce CO2-emissions by 
80-95% in the period 1990-2050, i.e. up to “factor 20”. This requires an increase 
of CO2-efficiency of 3% p.a. (80% goal) or even more ambitious 5% p.a. (95% 
goal). Again the problem is, that the trend of efficiency increase is much lower – 
and hence climate policy goals are missed (as for 2020). 
Such results were calculated and formulated by PwC in 2012: “The global econ-
omy now needs to cut carbon intensity by 5.1% every year from now to 2050 to 
achieve this carbon budget. This required rate of decarbonisation has not been 
seen even in a single year since the mid-20th century when these records began.”
2.3 IPAT EQUATION
A more general formula and an extension is the so called IPAT equation (intro-
duced in the 1970s by B. Commoner, P. R. Ehrlich and J. Holdren et al.):
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406 Impact = Technology * Affluence * Population
There are three components now, highlighting three strategic options for the 
reduction of environmental impact I: 
– I/GDP: reduction of the impact per unit of output (GDP), i.e. eco-efficiency.
– GDP/person: reduction of income per person, which is related to a reduc-
tion of consumption expenditure, i.e. sufficiency (in the rich countries). 
How much income and consumption are enough?
– Persons: Decline of (world) population could contribute to a lowering of I. 
This strategic option will not be addressed here as it is not a core variable 
for sustainable development in rich countries over the next two decades. 
Applied to climate change the IPAT-formula reads: 
CO2 = CO2/kWh * kWh/GDP * GDP/person * persons
The goal of reducing CO2-emissions could be compatible with economic growth, 
if carbon intensity of the energy system (CO2/kWh) and / or energy efficiency of 
the economy (kWh/GDP) declined. However, ambitious decarbonization goals 
(e.g. by 2040) will not be achievable in a growing economy. Growth will “con-
sume” efficiency increases and energy demand will not decline. If energy demand 
doesn’t decline it will not be possible to provide enough energy from renewable 
(CO2-free) sources – unless the installation of renewable capacities (including 
grid infrastructure and storage capacity) is accelerated dramatically – with high 
material and land resource consumption, i.e. shifting the (climate) problem to 
other goals of sustainable development. The solution is: reduction of CO2 per unit 
of GDP by 50% and switching to renewable sources for the remaining 50% – 
without growth of GDP (Kurz, Spangenberg and Zahrnt, 2019). A decline of pop-
ulation would allow for increases of GDP/person. 
2.4 IPATH EQUATION
GDP is an output measure and a measure of annual incomes. It is not an appropri-
ate measure beyond this narrow scope. GDP and especially GDP/person have 
been used as a proxy for standard of living, well-being and happiness H. This has 
been criticized in many publications (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). Neverthe-
less, the core goal of economic policy at least since WW II has been to increase of 
peoples’ incomes (growth policy). Based on the IPAT-equation this would have to 
be reversed: reduction of per capita income is identified as a potential contribution 
to the reduction of environmental impact. An extension of the IPAT formula pro-
vides additional insight: 
I = I / GDP * GDP / H * H / person * persons
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407This equation could be called the IPATH equation. It highlights a fourth compo-
nent for impact reduction: GDP/H is the expenditure for market-based goods and 
services needed per “unit of happiness”. This form of affluence has to decline. The 
challenge is to explore options for happiness (well-being, prosperity) which do 
not rely on (so much) material goods. Happiness H per person doesn’t have to 
decline. With less expenditure for consumption less income is needed. This pro-
vides the opportunity of less paid work and more leisure time – which can be an 
additional source of happiness. IPATH illustrates the “double delinking”: 
– delinking type 1 is I/GDP, the efficiency revolution
– delinking type 2 is GDP/H, the sufficiency revolution
If per capita income increases no more, this is not the end of increasing the “wealth 
of nations” which has been the explicit promise and job of economics since 1776. 
This dismal perspective would be unavoidable if income were the only determi-
nant of happiness (well-being). However, this is not the case: end of growth is not 
end of the pursuit of happiness.
3 EFFICIENCY, REBOUND EFFECTS AND GREEN GROWTH
Increase of eco-efficiency is the dominating answer to almost all challenges in the 
context of environmental sustainability goals: energy efficiency, resource effi-
ciency, land-use efficiency. Ambitious rates of increase in eco-efficiency (e.g. 5% 
p.a.) could delink economic growth and environmental impact. This section will 
analyse the prospects of this option. 
3.1 REBOUND EFFECTS 
The phenomenon is simple and omnipresent: If a product gets more efficient i.e. 
less resource consuming and hence less costly, this creates an incentive to buy and 
use more of it. The most famous historical case has been analysed by W. St. Jevons 
(1866), the Coal Question: “It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the 
economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very con-
trary is the truth. New modes of economy will lead to an increase of consump-
tion.” The explanation is: “If the quantity of coal used for blast-furnace be dimin-
ished in comparison with yield, the profits will increase, price will fall, demand 
increase… (over-)compensate the initial reduction of coal consumption.” This has 
been called the Jevons Paradox: Increase in resource efficiency may result in an 
increase rather than a decrease of total resource consumption. The rebound effect 
involves all economic decision-makers, companies as well as private households 
(consumers): higher efficiency, lower price, higher demand. Today, there are many 
more examples: 
– While energy efficiency of machines and consumer goods (refrigerator, 
heating etc.) increases, overall energy consumption does not decline. 
– With more efficient light technology (LEDs) nobody is bothering about 
turning off the lights. 
– More fuel-efficient car engines encourage higher powered cars (SUVs), 
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408 – With better insulation of buildings, heating costs decline, higher room tem-
perature is “affordable”, and it is not necessary to wear a sweater any more. 
RE are identified by comparing two cases: what would the effect of an efficiency 
increase be on the quantity of (energy) demand if the price remained constant? 
Energy demand would then be constant and the higher efficiency would com-
pletely reduce overall energy consumption. This hypothetical case is compared 
with the more realistic case that price declines due to more efficient (cost reduc-
ing) technology. The delta is the RE. 
If fuel consumption of cars declines from 7 litre per 100 km to 6.3 this is a 10% 
increase of fuel efficiency. The expectation would be that total fuel consumption 
(and CO2-emissions) will also decline by 10%. If the decline is only 5% (1%) 
there is a rebound effect of 50% (90%). The “gap” of five percentage points is the 
result of higher demand for fuel (more and longer rides, faster driving etc.). Half 
of the efficiency increase is lost, “consumed” by users. If there is no reduction at 
all (0%), the rebound effect is 100% (full rebound). If there is actually an increase 
in demand, this is called “backfire”.
Efficiency increase has direct and indirect effects and empirical results depend on 
the scope of analysis. Focus of RE analysis is on the direct, sector-specific effect 
of a more eco-efficient technology, on lower costs and prices and higher demand 
(e.g. more fuel efficient cars, demand for fuels). However, price reductions also 
have an income effect, i.e. lower price is equal to higher (real) income. The sav-
ings from the fuel efficient car could also be used for an (additional) flight and 
hence would not be reflected in the demand for car fuel – an underestimation of 
the rebound effect. In more general macro-economic terms, eco-efficient tech-
nologies have the potential to stimulate overall GDP-growth (“green growth”) 
which is related to all kinds of additional natural resource consumption (macro 
rebound). The new technology also comes with its inherent eco-impacts, e.g. 
e-cars depend on critical resources for batteries; more efficient buildings “con-
sume” (additional) insulation material. These effects throughout the (global) sup-
ply-chain would have to be included in a complete analysis of RE. 
Increases in eco-efficiency are part of the economic innovation process. They are 
typically the result of cost-intensive R&D activities and innovators will try to 
charge a high price to cover these costs and to earn an (extra-ordinary) profit as a 
reward for their successful research efforts. It will depend on their monopoly 
power whether the eco-efficient technology comes with low(er) prices. Monopoly 
power could be a constraint on diffusion and hence on rebound effects, at least a 
temporary effect until barriers to market entry erode. In fact already Jevons’ coal 
question highlights an innovation process: a more efficient steam engine is now 
attractive for new uses throughout the economy (diffusion); this is the basic rea-
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409The explanation of RE can be based on standard micro-economics and rational 
decision making only: lower cost (total cost of ownership) increases demand. 
Behavioural Economics beyond rational decision making can add some aspects: 
– People tend to forget the initial (high) investment cost and make everyday 
decisions based on marginal cost: the additional cost of the “extra mile” 
with an efficient diesel car then is calculated as 5 litres = 6 € per 100 km; 
actually, it is roughly 0.30 €/km, i.e. 30 € per 100 km.
– People “reward” themselves for doing something eco-friendly (moral 
licensing). Shoppers who bring their own bags to the supermarket tend to 
buy more sweets, crisps and ice cream. Households that succeed in reduc-
ing their water consumption tend to increase their electricity consumption 
(Karmarkar and Bollinger, 2014). 
3.2 MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECT: GREEN GROWTH
Based on optimism about continuous eco-efficiency increases, the concept of 
“Green Growth” (OECD, 2011; Kurz, 2014; 2019a) develops a positive vision of 
future growth combined with SDGs compliance. This is still the dominating 
defence of the growth paradigm in the conflict with the goal of environmentally 
sustainable development. However, the emphasis of the potential of this solution 
is not supported by empirical evidence. Nowhere are there cases of efficiency 
growth rates larger than 5% p.a. over a longer period of time. To base sustainable 
development (e.g. climate protection) only on (unpredictable) eco-efficiency 
increases in the future would be irresponsible. As it is not possible to rule out the 
existence of a black swan, it is not possible to deny a small probability for GG. 
However, like black swans, it is a very rare species.
In sum, GG is not a solution as long as the size of greening (substitution effects) 
is over-compensated by the size of growth (income effects). On a limited planet, 
economic growth cannot continue forever, not even over the next decades, as there 
is no evidence that it could be delinked effectively and fast from environmental 
impacts by dramatic increases of eco-efficiency (efficiency revolution). 
3.3 RELEVANCE OF ECO-EFFICIENCY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Jevons Paradox and the analysis of RE are adding to the warning not to over-
estimate what technology can do for a reduction of environment impacts. Eco-
efficiency is not the silver bullet for resolving the conflict between economic 
growth and environmental SDGs. So far, efficiency increases are not large enough 
to achieve sustainability goals in growing economies, i.e. growth and sustainable 
development are incompatible. Either (rich) nations give up their growth policy or 
they will fail to comply with their SDGs and hence shift incalculable burdens onto 
their (grand-)children. In other words: Either give up income (perceived as wealth) 
or give up moral integrity. 
The important function of the efficiency option will remain: Technology can buy 
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410 risky fields, e.g. nuclear and fossil substituted by renewable energy – presumably 
without any cost (the sun is sending no bills). Eventually it turns out that old risks 
have been traded against new ones – often no less serious (e.g. the resource prob-
lems of e-mobility related to lithium, cobalt and so on). The general efficiency or 
modernization promise turns out to be flawed. Technology is not a causal therapy, 
rather a tool for crisis management. It is popular because it is comfortable for 
(almost) everyone: consumers don’t have to change their behaviour, politicians 
don’t have to make unpopular proposals and decisions, companies find new mar-
kets (green growth). The more fundamental issue of sufficiency, the limits of con-
sumerism and the limits to growth (Meadows et al. 1972), is much harder to 
address. As the efficiency revolution loses some of its glamour, sufficiency and 
de-growth gain attractiveness. The learning spreads that sustainable development 
is not a technology race but a fundamental reorientation of human and economic 
development, a cultural revolution.
4 SUFFICIENCY AND RESILIENCE
4.1 BASIC IDEA
The basic idea of sufficiency has been around for centuries in religious and philo-
sophical contexts: How much is enough? How much is necessary for a good life? 
Economist from Smith to Mill and to Keynes addressed the issue and the perspec-
tives of increasing wealth by providing more and more consumer goods. Critique 
of “consumerism” has a long tradition (Veblen, 1899; Galbraith, 1958). The new 
context today is sustainable development: What level of consumption is possible 
today (for living generations) without ruining the natural foundations of life for 
future generations? Formulated as a moral question it runs how can we enjoy our 
lives at the cost of our grandchildren? Sufficiency is the real core of sustainable 
development, i.e. development (advancement of socio-economic goals) within the 
carrying capacity of eco-systems, respecting the environmental limitations 
(Begrenzungskrise). The question of the limits of natural resource consumption, 
which started the sustainable development debate in the 1970s, leads to the ques-
tion of the limits of the production and consumption of goods and services. How 
much more is possible – given the well-known “side effects” (e.g. on climate 
change)? After a period of unprecedented increase of material wealth (GDP), the 
costs and benefits of additional income and consumption have to be re-evaluated. 
Instead of postponing the sufficiency debate a more proactive attitude is necessary.
Sufficiency addresses the question of how many products and services consumers 
actually need. Would fewer quantities and less spending reduce consumers’ hap-
piness (overall life satisfaction, well-being, utility)? Interwoven but conceptually 
different from the “less” is the “different” aspect: choosing a different product 
(e.g. more fuel-efficient car). While most sufficiency debates cover both aspects, 
the challenge clearly is on the “less / fewer”, the “zero option”. More efficient 
(“smart”) solutions easily find acceptance – at least in market niches, from smart 
cars to smart homes, as long as the “less” is avoided. The core sufficiency chal-
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411mobility (fewer kilometres travelled), less energy demand (lower room tempera-
ture), less land consumption (smaller apartments). Sufficiency is not identical 
with Verzicht (renunciation, self-deprivation) – which includes an element of 
(willingly) suffering and could be beneficial e.g. in a religious context.
Sufficiency is a challenge for individual consumer behaviour and it has significant 
macro-economic implications. It is a challenge to the core idea of economic 
growth. Less consumer demand means less production, less investment and a 
smaller GDP. It causes new economic adaptation and transformation problems 
which are challenging for theory and for policy. 
The sufficiency revolution is more challenging than the efficiency revolution and 
has the potential of a cultural revolution, a fundamental change of society and 
economy. It is not just about eating a little bit less meat or flying less. Sufficiency 
is questioning the whole concept of “pursuit of happiness” by means of increasing 
the production and consumption of more goods. It is about breaking up the vicious 
circle of more needs, more income, more (alienated) work, more (compensating) 
consumption. It constitutes the duty to work against hedonistic consumerism – 
and increasing “flight shame” might be a first success. Refocusing the materialis-
tic system and developing cultural perspectives beyond can rely on many sources 
– from Fromm (1976, to have or to be) to Illich (1973, self-sufficiency, convivial-
ity). The open question is, whether developed nations will be able to achieve the 
huge cultural accomplishment of voluntarily imposing limitations on the use of 
natural resources. This is not impossible as has been demonstrated related to the 
factor labour (child work, slave work) – and the Paris Agreement (2015) could be 
another success story. 
4.2 QUANTIFYING EFFECTS
The difference between a (moderate) business-as-usual growth scenario (plus 2% 
p.a.) and a (moderate) de-growth scenario (minus 1% p.a.) is quite significant: 
49+18, i.e. 67 percentage points. In terms of average annual income: the initial 
annual income of e.g. €36,000 either increases to €53,640 or it declines to €2,520, 
a difference of €24.120. To “digest” and to manage such a swing in perspectives 
and biographies is unprecedented in the last decades. 
Table 1
Economic growth projections, 2020-2040
Growth rate % 
p.a. 
Year
3 2 1 0 -1
2020 100 100 100 100 100
2030 134 122 110 100  90
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412 What could the sufficiency option contribute to sustainable development? To 
quantify the potential effects we can focus on the global CO2-emissions of 35 bil-
lon tons p.a. (World Bank data) and assume that
– the affluent billion is responsible for roughly half of it, i.e. has emissions of 
17 t per capita p.a. (e.g. US 16.5 t/capita; Germany 9 t/capita);
– the rest of the world population (6 billion people) has 3 t per capita p.a. 
(e.g. India 2 t/capita);
– the affluent billion succeeds by 2050 to make a 50% reduction in their 
consumption (and incomes) – and as a consequence in their per capita 
CO2-emissions. 
Global CO2-emission would decline by 8.5 billion tons p.a., from 35 billion tons 
p.a. today to 26.5 billion p.a., i.e. a 24% reduction of total global CO2-emissions. 
If reductions of 80-90% are necessary for the < 2°C goal, and if we assume an 
efficiency factor 4 (= 75% reduction), sufficiency could close the gap. If the effi-
ciency effect is smaller, sufficiency is even more important. In this scenario the 
50% reduction of consumer spending is extremely ambitious and the question is 
what could make such an option attractive to the affluent? 
Could “less” really be an attractive perspective for a majority of people? A little 
bit less seems to be attractive – at least if the success of publications on “simplify 
your life” is accepted as an indicator. It is doubtful whether significantly less 
would find any public support. Would anyone join an initiative to reduce con-
sumption expenditures by 1% every year over a period of 20 years (i.e. roughly 
20% in total)? How many would subscribe to the idea “50% less”? 
So far, sufficiency still has niche status, identified in empirical studies e.g. as 
LOHAS (lifestyle of health and sustainability), LOVOS (Lifestyles of Voluntary 
Simplicity) or labelled as “downshifting” or “minimalism”. However, public 
attention seems to increase. Companies did spot the trend and integrate it in their 
advertisement (not always in their strategy). There are many projects organized by 
civil society organizations (like repair cafés, urban gardening). The young genera-
tion is asking for work-life-balance and is willing to give up income in order to 
raise kids. Mobility patterns are changing, urban citizens own no car (don’t even 
have a driving license) and flight shame is often mentioned. Consumption of veg-
etarian and vegan food is on the rise. New forms of living together are being 
tested. The environmental impact of such elements of new lifestyles is hard to 
measure. So far, it seems the overall effect is not significant: mobility is increasing 
(although it is smarter); the average size of an apartment increases (as the number 
of single households increases). In sum: there is change in niches, high creative 
potential, some “business cases” – and ample opportunity for more. More creative 
solutions will emerge, all demonstrating that sufficient lifestyles are not equal to 
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4134.3 MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS: SECULAR STAGNATION
A macro consequence of a continuously declining consumer demand could be 
economic stagnation or even decline. This depends also on the other components 
of demand: investment In, government spending G and trade balance (Ex-Im):
GDP = C + In + G + (Ex-Im)
When consumer demand declines, investment will follow suit. With a declining 
GDP, tax revenues and hence government spending will decline (permanent deficit 
spending ruled out). Exports could compensate for all this. Together with an 
expected decline of imports (closely related to economic activity), this will create 
a large surplus in the trade balance. Other countries will have to run a deficit – and 
will not accept this long-term. If secular stagnation is the long-term perspective 
(Summers 2016), the second interesting question is related to the adaption process: 
How to make this a smooth adaption rather than a cumulative downward spiral? 
There is little knowledge concerning or research into designing such a process. 
Other stagnation effects are transferred via labour markets (supply side): If indi-
viduals consume less, they need less income and hence could reduce worktime 
(enjoy more leisure time). If labour supply declines, various effects will compen-
sate for this: increasing wages, automatization, global supply chains. In some seg-
ments (with specific high qualifications) labour supply could become a bottleneck 
and restrict growth. More leisure time could be invested in community projects 
and thus increase social capital. 
Keynes’ (1930) vision was that within a century, average people could reduce 
working hours to 15 hours per week. This forecast is based on
GDP = GDP/hour * hours/worker * workers
If labour productivity (GDP/hour) grows at 2% p.a. over 100 years, it would easily 
be possible to reduce labour time for a given number of workers producing a con-
stant GDP to 15 hours/worker. But why is everyone still working much longer 
(e.g. 35 hours/week in Germany)? Obviously workers were not satisfied with their 
income (GDP) as of 1930. Most of the efficiency gains were thus used for higher 
incomes and consumption levels. And this is still the situation: productivity 
increase can be used for wage increases or for reduction of working hours. Only 
when workers are satisfied with their income levels, will Keynes’ vision be able to 
unfold its full potential: more leisure time could make people happier. 
4.4 SUFFICIENCY POLICY
Today sufficiency is primarily an individual search process, testing new consump-
tion patterns, exploring and finding new lifestyles (social innovation). Govern-
ment policy is not supportive as it is focused on fostering the innovation and 
growth process, the increase of GDP/capita as the only relevant indicator for eco-
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414 will have little effect. Research on and implementation of sufficiency policy is the 
next crucial step for sustainable development. 
Sufficiency is a challenge not only for individual decision making but also for 
political decision making on the framework conditions that are always a determi-
nant in consumers’ decision making. A government sufficiency policy could ena-
ble and incentivize consumers. However, no consistent concept has been formu-
lated yet. It has to steer clear of paternalism and eco-dictatorship. It would be 
naïve to leave it to individuals alone to change their decisions without addressing 
the political framework conditions which influence these decisions. Well-inten-
tioned moral behaviour will finally surrender to hostile circumstances. The legal 
and institutional framework has to be favourable for moral decision making. 
Moreover, if consumers had to include a complex, multi-dimensional goal system 
like the UN SDGs in their decision making, they would be hopelessly overbur-
dened. Complexity reduction and translation is necessary. 
The first step could be to stop all forms of growth policy: Abolish all growth-
stimulating measures e.g. in the tax code, revise deregulation, no unspecific sub-
sidies for R&D. Laws that define growth as goal for government policy should be 
abated. Government expenditure has to be restructured, e.g. infrastructure invest-
ment: no new roads, runways and terminals – bike lanes and public transportation 
instead. Environmental restrictions have to be “translated” in regulations and con-
crete caps e.g. parking lots, runway slots.
The next step is to develop a holistic concept of a sufficiency policy that includes 
(almost) all fields of government policy, at least check their relevance and the 
effectiveness of potential changes. Following the conventional list of economic 
policy instruments this creates the following list: 
(1) Information: Reduce complexity by creating / supporting reliable labels 
(fair trade, FSC etc.). Support for traditional consumer protection organi-
zation should be redirected to include sustainability issues. Results of 
behavioural economics on (irrational) consumer behaviour provide new 
approaches (nudging).
(2) Education: Consumer behaviour and decision making have little connec-
tion with those of the autonomous textbook individual. Preferences are 
formed as part of the industrial production process. Education could con-
tribute to make individuals more independent of status and consumer 
goods and strengthen their personal capabilities. 
(3) Voluntary agreements: Companies often claim a pioneer role in sustaina-
bility and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and could voluntarily do 
more beyond reporting, especially in their product policy (longevity vs. 
obsolescence).
(4) Government spending (purchasing behaviour, lead customer), infrastruc-
ture investment (bike lanes and public transportation instead of autobahns), 
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415(5) Prices could be a simple indicator for sustainable consumption and change 
consumer decisions significantly – if only they told the (ecological and 
social) “truth”. Government can correct market prices by taxes and subsi-
dies. Alternatives are cap-and-trade systems. 
(6) Regulation (command and control) always seems to be the ultima ratio. 
However, this instrument has significant advantages as it relieves individuals 
from the burden of decision making, is fair (equal for everyone) and effec-
tive. Examples: fuel-efficiency standards, phase-out of fossil car engines. 
5 PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
To achieve ambitious SDGs, e.g. carbon neutrality by 2040, both strategic options 
– efficiency and sufficiency – have to be activated and strengthened. What would 
be the core elements of efficiency policy and of sufficiency policy and how can the 
two be integrated (transformation planning)?
5.1 INCREASE ECO-EFFICIENCY GROWTH RATE 
The challenge is to stimulate and to redirect innovation activity into an eco-efficient 
direction. Government policy has only limited influence on innovation activity (e.g. 
Steger et al. 2005; https://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecoap/frontpage_en on EU 
eco-innovation policies). The most general tool is to change expectations of entre-
preneurs and investors. Government and civil society organizations together have to 
stimulate a public debate on “the future we want”. This influences strategies and 
direction of search activities (e.g. the climate debate and new mobility solutions). In 
more detail, eco innovation policy could combine a set of instruments: 
– Government R&D expenditures (from basic research to market entry and 
diffusion) for “green” technologies and market segments (e.g. wind and 
solar energy). Redirect science system in general (WBGU, 2011). 
– Price signal (e.g. taxing negative external effects of CO2-emissions) and 
financial incentives (e.g. favourable depreciation rules) to make (eco-)
investments more attractive i.e. profitable (e.g. in renewable energies). 
– Technology forcing by regulations, e.g. ambitious fuel-efficiency fleet 
standards. Forced phase-out of hazardous and/or polluting technologies 
(e.g. coal-fired power plants).
5.2  REDUCE REBOUND EFFECTS: CONTROL OF PRICE REDUCTIONS  
AND/OR DEMAND
RE can be directly addressed and reduced if either the cost and price reductions 
are eliminated or the potential expansion of demand (quantity) is restricted. To 
eliminated the decline of prices, a (eco-)tax could be introduced – with tax rates 
increasing with the rate of eco-efficiency growth (and tax revenue spend for eco 
or social goals). This could be e.g. a CO2-tax with eco-bonus. The same function 
could be fulfilled if real incomes could be reduced when people work less and 
enjoy more leisure time (reduction of working hours). Most effective would be 
quantitative restrictions (caps). More efficient (cheaper) fishing technology can 
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416 defines reductions of CO2-emissions – no matter what eco-efficiency does; effi-
ciency increases are crucial for the price of certificates, i.e. the cost for companies 
and society. Other regulations include e.g. in the mobility sector limitation of car 
“horsepower” and/or speed limits (so that it makes less sense to buy high-powered 
cars). Parking restrictions for SUVs instead of additional (larger) SUV parking 
lots and/or general reduction of parking space. In sum, there are policies capable 
of reducing the RE but these are neither popular nor easy to enforce.
5.3 SUFFICIENCY POLICY
The stability of capitalist systems is based on the old recipe developed by Adam 
Smith (1776): increase the supply of goods and keep people busy. To keep people 
satisfied, a permanently increasing quantity and quality (innovation) of goods is 
necessary and people need to have jobs – to finance consumption and to structure 
their life time. Under these conditions the system works well and is stable. Only 
recently has there been more attention to the question of whether this logic will 
prevail. Being trapped in the work-consumption-circle is no longer a generally 
shared vision and this type of “social contract” is losing its attraction the wealthier 
nations and individuals get. Mill (1848) and Keynes (1930) recognized this and 
they emphasized the positive aspects. Today there is ample empirical evidence 
that beyond a certain level of income, further increase of income and consumption 
will not increase well-being and happiness (Easterlin 1996; Frey, 2008). 
To make it acceptable for a majority of voters, sufficiency has to be attractive, i.e. 
it has to fulfil a (basic) need. In rich societies the basic material needs are fulfilled 
(on average). However, there are more sophisticated needs which play a more 
vital role. People are interested in non-materialistic “products” like social respon-
sibility, making sense of their life, personal integrity. Of course, there are mecha-
nisms to compensate for deficiencies in these dimensions. An increasing enter-
tainment industry is supportive in distracting attention from such (potential) 
needs. And human beings have learned to live with “cognitive dissonance”, i.e. 
knowledge is not necessarily transformed into action. However, with increasing 
knowledge and awareness about environmental degradation and the burdening of 
future generations, these expulsion mechanisms become fragile. More often peo-
ple tend to act – at least with alibi consumption (some fair-trade products, bio-
food, sometime vegetarian meals, e-bike). This need is also served by joining 
demonstrations (e.g. against climate change, F4F). It is in this context that a con-
sistent and effective sufficiency policy could find (many) supporters. It offers a 
way out of individual moral dilemmas. 
Even if sufficiency is attractive to individuals it will not easily be transformed into 
sufficiency policy. Resistance comes from companies which invest heavily in 
advertisements to stabilize demand for their products, turning “insatiable needs” 
from a textbook assumption into a reality. In fact, there is a (global) homogeniza- 
tion of (western) lifestyles and popular culture (Ritzer, 1993) driven by communi-
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417realities than in nature. The competition-driven innovation system throws out 
“new” products every day, often just minor (incremental) changes and “fashions”. 
Innovation is celebrated without realizing the dark side of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 1911), the premature obsolescence of perfectly functioning products 
(Kurz, 2015). Consumers are locked-in with the old products (stranded assets). 
In sum, the basic challenge (in rich countries) is to correct expectations and to 
establish a “new normal”, i.e. to foster cultural change, the mental infrastructure 
for soft landing after the growth age. 
5.4 TRANSFORMATION DESIGN AND POLICY
The SDGs are an expression of a changing value system and they change the goal 
system and the priorities in society and economy. Environmental and social goals 
define new limitations for economic expansion. In macro-economic terms, the chal-
lenge is to manage the transformation process at the end of an almost hundred year 
period of economic growth (Gordon 2016). How is a soft landing to be designed 
(Victor 2008)? This challenge has a long-term component, replacing the growth-
focus by a more open development concept. And it has a more medium-term com-
ponent, the formulation of a transformation strategy for the next two decades. 
The main challenge for de-growth policy is to avoid “overshooting” reaction of 
the system, i.e. a self-feeding crisis (economic tipping point) with huge losses for 
all (like the financial crisis of 2008). Traditional crisis intervention mechanisms 
(monetary and fiscal) could do the job. 
Intra-generational justice under de-growth conditions means more redistribution of 
incomes and wealth. As vulnerable groups (low-income households) have to be 
protected from decline of income, higher income groups will have to pay more 
taxes. How will the privileged react? Do the lucky ones in the lottery of life under-
stand their responsibility and are they willing to share (more) with the less privi-
leged? As conflict potential increases, investment in social capital (inclusion, par-
ticipation, dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms) is vital and required today. 
The better prepared it is, the less painful will the birth of a post-growth society be. 
During the transition to sustainable development, economy and society will face a 
fast and comprehensive structural change including the decline of old (still suc-
cessful) industries (like the automobile) and regions as well as (global) supply 
chains and patterns of specialization. The dramatic structural change needs reliable 
definition of goals, e.g. a deadline for nuclear power, for coal-fired power plants, 
for fossil-fuel cars. Transition planning also has to include stimuli and compensa-
tion measures to make structural change more acceptable for people affected. 
Pressure increases for all groups. Different qualifications and skills are needed, 
often with lower payment and status, sometimes at different locations (disloca-
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418 Starting from a quite comfortable status quo, defence of this status and aversion to 
change are plausible. During the transformation process all forms of resistance 
will occur (in companies, in the political arena). Transition design and manage-
ment will be crucial and have to be based on resilient and reliable institutions 
(schools, education, science, media, courts, police). 
Companies are used to a growth world and have no idea how to thrive in a no-
growth environment – where average entrepreneurial talent might not be enough: 
Exemptions are e.g. Patagonia with their “don’t buy!” campaign, referring to the 
sufficiency idea (https://www.patagonia.com/blog/2011/11/dont-buy-this-jacket-
black-friday-and-the-new-york-times/). What could government do the better to 
prepare companies and managers for a no-growth world? More competition or 
more cooperation? Higher profits to kindle entrepreneurial spirits? More venture 
capital for start-ups?
To avoid disaster, design of the transformation process is necessary. Although 
detailed planning is not possible, at least some key features could be the subjects 
of government planning and supporting policies. Core elements of transformation 
design are:
– Strategic planning with implementation process (plan-do-check-act, PDCA).
– Principles and financial resources for burden sharing (compensation).
– Institutions for discourse and conflict resolution.
One example for discourse based transformation planning in the context of cli-
mate protection is the coal phase-out in Germany (Kohleausstieg): phase-out of all 
coal-fired power plants by 2038 – with government compensation payments and 
regional adaptation programs (in total 40 billion €). However, this example covers 
a small industrial segment (some 20,000 jobs). Much more complex (and expen-
sive) will be the transformation of the German automobile industry (with more 
than 800,000 jobs). No accompanying transformation policy for this industry has 
been formulated. Other sectors of the economy will also come under heavy adap-
tation pressure as a consequence of a reinforced efficiency and sufficiency policy: 
the chemical industry, agriculture, housing and construction. 
5.5 PERSPECTIVE: POST-GROWTH SOCIETY
Based on the global consensus on the UN SGDs, especially on climate change 
(Paris Agreement), and commitments formulated in national sustainable develop-
ment strategies, the growth paradigm is under pressure. As the SDGs address over-
consumption of natural resources and over-burdening of future generations, reduc-
tions are an unavoidable consequence. “Delinking” would be a (comfortable) way 
out: more output (GDP) with less input (resources), i.e. an eco-efficiency revolu- 
tion. But this is just a hypothetical case and is not backed by empirical evidence. If 
an eco-efficiency revolution does not do the job, growth is not compatible with 
sustainable development. To reduce environmental impact, production and con-
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419to study (and to implement) de-growth. This is not just a little technical change of 
a few percentage points, e.g. instead of plus 2% p.a. in the past, minus 1% in the 
future. This is the end of the growth paradigm, which has dominated economics 
and all fields of policy on a global scale after WW II. In fact, the challenge is to 
formulate a new paradigm for the post-growth era. Research on de-growth and on 
the post-growth paradigm is therefore of increasing importance. But it is difficult 
and time-consuming to replace an established paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).
The growth paradigm no longer provides convincing answers to the core problems 
of today. The new paradigm for the post-growth-era could start by replacing 
“growth” by the more open concept of (economic) “development” – as outlined 
by Schumpeter (1911). The core idea is economic development as an open decen-
tralized search process without an orientation to growth but emphasizing perma-
nent, sometimes disruptive change and transition processes, which could be 
cumulative and destructive or rather smooth (by design). 
Under the conditions of the Anthropocene, future development has to respect 
(planetary) boundaries (Rockström et al. 2017), i.e. it has to be “sustainable devel-
opment”. To comply with environmental goals like climate-neutrality by 2040 
most rich countries will have to reduce the scale of their economic activity and 
consumption patterns (de-growth). The process of transition to sustainable long-
term level and structure could be painful with increasing conflict potentials and 
not very attractive to consumers, companies and voters. It is a farewell to the 
wealth promise as we knew it: more, bigger, faster. As incomes will decline rather 
than increase, additional wealth and well-being has to come from different sources, 
pursuit of happiness redirected: labour conditions, leisure time, fairness, inclusion 
and participation. This is no less than a cultural revolution, one that is already 
emerging, although in niche projects only (repair cafés, urban gardening etc.).
The micro foundation of de-growth is sufficiency, i.e. lifestyles and consumption 
patterns which emphasize “less” in all fields of consumption (from mobility to 
housing and food). If consumer demand declines, investment will follow and the 
emerging development pattern then could be characterized as “secular stagnation” 
or “stationary state”. In fact, sufficiency is the core of the sustainability debate as 
it addresses limits and limitations (Begrenzungskrise). Sustainable development is 
not possible without limitations of production and consumption, i.e. fundamental 
changes in lifestyles (of the rich). This is not the end of the pursuit of happiness 
and increasing well-being (Jackson 2009). However, fundamental learning and a 
process of change (social innovation) are necessary, and they are much less com-
fortable and welcome than fascinating new technologies. Individuals tend to 
defend their comfort zone and resist a painful learning process. 
Could a Post-Growth-Society be attractive, win voters’ support? This depends 
first of all on problem awareness. Do (many) people understand that their lifestyle 




















































43 (4) 401-422 (2019)
420 de-growth are then welcome as a “pain relief” and there is willingness to pay a 
price. After all, this price is not exorbitantly high for two reasons: For wealthy 
people additional income is not highly attractive (marginal utility almost zero); 
future costs of inactivity would be even higher (for climate change Stern, 2006). 
As illustrated already by Mill (1848) and Keynes (1930) a stationary state could 
be a positive vision. However, the visions and images created by the powerful, 
needs-stimulating advertising-industrial complex drive societies permanently in 
the opposite direction. The end of the growth age finds rich societies and citizens 
unprepared. Most people are still in the delirium of the growth party – as the band 
continues to play on the Titanic. 
Disclosure statement 
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